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Abstract
This Essay builds on the available literature to date and offers a more probing examination of
the international arbitrator and nationality. The opening section reiterates how arbitrator nation-
ality relates to the traditional requirements of arbitrator impartiality, independence, and neutrality
(with which the “arbitrator” is most synonymous); how arbitral rules seek diversity of nationality
between the tribunal and the parties; the underlying reasons for national neutrality being the ac-
cepted practice in international arbitration; and criticisms of the practice. With this background
in place, the Essay poses challenging questions relating to the arbitrator’s nationality, with the
aid of hypothetical permutations of an international arbitration matter. The hypothetical, which
will offer varying descriptions of prospective arbitrators’ nationality and national affiliation, will
inspire further discussion on the always difficult issues of party challenge of the arbitrator and the
arbitrator’s disclosures. The hypothetical will be put to the test in a survey of international arbitra-
tion attorneys from one country asked to give their reactions to prospective arbitrators who have
varying degrees of association to another country. Given the sensitivity to national identification
in the international commercial arbitration arena, the matter of the nationality of the arbitrator will
continue to be of interest.
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps it is a tautology that in the resolution of commer-
cial disputes in the international arena, nationality-of the par-
ties and the deciding forum-matters a great deal. When a dis-
pute arises, requiring resolution by a neutral arbiter, partners in
business become adverse parties, and both sides are wary of plac-
ing the decision in the hands of the judiciary of their counter-
part's country, out of fear that common nationality might result
in national judges favoring their compatriots. For this and other
reasons, some parties prefer arbitration as the method of resolv-
ing international commercial disputes.' It is both the peculiarity
and the essence of the arbitration method that allow-in the
very same setting-national commonality to perpetuate and na-
tionalistic favoritism to be neutralized.
In many arbitration matters involving three-member tribu-
nals, each party is likely to select an arbitrator of the same na-
tionality,2 with the understanding that the party-appointed arbi-
trator will inform the tribunal of the appointing party's legal and
* Edward W. Hinton Professor of Law & Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of
Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri. For their thoughtful comments and sugges-
tions, I am grateful to Gerald Aksen,Jack Coe, Christopher R. Drahozal, William Fisch,
Tom Ginsburg, John Gotanda, Paul Ladehoff, William W. (Rusty) Park, Michael Reis-
man, Catherine Rogers, and Tibor Varady.
1. See Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REv. INT'L ARB.
267, 280 (1996) (referring to "distinct advantage" in arbitration over court adjudication
in international setting). A revealing empirical study, however, questions whether com-
panies actually prefer arbitration over litigation, at least enough to include an arbitra-
tion clause in their contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The flight
from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 335 (2007). In their examination of 2,800 contracts
of various public firms, Professors Eisenberg and Miller concluded that "[i ] nternational
contracts include arbitration clauses ... at a surprisingly low rate." Id. at 373.
2. See Pryles, supra note 1, at 280.
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business culture. Ideally, the party-appointed arbitrator serves as
a cultural intermediary and translator. Yet parties commonly
insist that the chair of the tribunal, or the sole arbitrator in cases
involving one arbitrator, be a national of a country other than
those of the parties.4 All references to "arbitrator" herein are to
the chair or sole arbitrator, unless the context refers to arbitra-
tors generally or party-appointed arbitrators. It is said that this
practice of national neutrality is widely followed, and even pro-
vided for, to varying extents, in the rules of the major arbitration
organizations under which parties agree to arbitrate claims.5
Consideration of the nationality of the arbitrator is quite impor-
tant then, to parties, counsel, and administering organizations;
and when arbitrator nationality is disregarded, it could be of in-
terest to reviewing courts that are requested to decline the
award.6
Commentators have discussed the nationality of the tribunal
in international arbitration, but usually in brief recitations.7
This Essay builds on the available literature to date and offers a
more probing examination of the subject. The opening section
reiterates how arbitrator nationality relates to the traditional re-
quirements of arbitrator impartiality, independence, and neu-
trality (with which it is most synonymous); how arbitral rules
seek diversity of nationality between the tribunal and the parties;
the underlying reasons for national neutrality being the ac-
cepted practice in international arbitration; and criticisms of the
practice. With this background in place, the Essay poses chal-
lenging questions relating to the arbitrator's nationality, with the
aid of hypothetical permutations of an international arbitration
matter. The hypothetical, which will offer varying descriptions
3. See Rosabel E. Goodman-Everard, Cultural Diversity in International Arbitration-A
Challenge for Decision-Makers and Decision-Making, 7 ARB. INT'L 155, 158 (1990); Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some Reflections,
30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 65 (1995).
4. See Pryles, supra note 1, at 280.
5. See infta text accompanying notes 29-33 (discussing requirement of national
neutrality in some rules of major arbitration organizations and exceptions to this re-
quirement).
6. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing potential results of failure
to adhere to party agreements concerning national neutrality of arbitrators).
7. Two works that offer the most detailed examination are: Pierre Lalive, On the
Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of Arbitration, in Swiss EsSAYs ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 23 (1984), and ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRAcTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 202-03 (4th ed. 2004).
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of prospective arbitrators' nationality and national affiliation,
will inspire further discussion on the always difficult issues of
party challenge of the arbitrator and the arbitrator's disclosures.
The hypothetical will be put to the test in a survey of interna-
tional arbitration attorneys from one country asked to give their
reactions to prospective arbitrators who have varying degrees of
association to another country. Given the sensitivity to national
identification in the international commercial arbitration arena,
the matter of the nationality of the arbitrator will continue to be
of interest.
I. NATIONALITY, INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY,
AND NEUTRALITY
It is a maxim of international commercial arbitration that
the arbitrator deciding the dispute must be independent and im-
partial.' The major administering organizations explicitly de-
mand these basic qualifications in their rules.9 Yet none of the
various rules further elaborate on what independence or impar-
tiality entails, inviting commentators to offer definitional analy-
8. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 199; see also Int'l Bar Assoc. ("IBA"),
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in Int'l Arbitration 7 (2004) [hereinafter IBA Guide-
lines] (Explanation to General Standard 1).
9. See Am. Arbitration Assoc. ("AAA"), International Arbitration Rules, art. 7(1)
(2000) [hereinafter AAA International Rules] ("Arbitrators acting under these rules
shall be impartial and independent"); London Court of Int'l Arbitration ("LCIA"), Ar-
bitration Rules, art. 5.2 (1998) [hereinafter LCIA Rules] ("All arbitrators conducting an
arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and indepen-
dent of the parties. . . ."). The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Arbitra-
tion Rules omit a separate requirement of impartiality: "Every arbitrator must be and
remain independent of the parties involved in arbitration." Int'l Chamber of Com-
merce, Arbitration Rules, art. 7(1) (1998) [hereinafter ICC Rules]. The United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules, the
leading rules for ad hoc arbitrations, provide, "In making the appointment, the ap-
pointing authority shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure the
appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator .... " G.A. Res. 31/98, art.
6(4), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]. The phrasing tracks the language of the UNCITRAL
model law, which includes a provision for the appointment of the arbitrator by a proper
authority. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, G.A. Res.
40/72, art. 11(4), U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex I & A/61/17/Annex I (June 21,
1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. Japan is one of the few countries with an
arbitration statute that includes references to qualifications of impartiality and indepen-
dence. Chusai-Ho [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 17(6) (ii), translated in
HANs SMIT, THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & Lou ~s MisrEus, NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAws
JAP B-7 (2006).
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sis. Two deans of the field, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter,
having reflected on their previous distinction between indepen-
dence and impartiality, have since noted the recent trend to-
wards viewing the two as "opposite side[s] of the same coin.""
That is, independence on one side refers to the arbitrator's rela-
tionship with one of the parties; on the other side, impartiality
"is considered to be connected with actual or apparent bias of an
arbitrator-either in favour of one of the parties or in relation to
the issues in dispute."'1 These terms are considered as a pack-
age, "usually joined together as a term of art."12 The basic quali-
fications of arbitrator independence and impartiality should, it
would seem, be sufficient to ensure fair deliberation of the
claims, equal treatment of the parties, and party confidence in
the process.
Yet in the discussion of the essential requirements for arbi-
trators, commentators have also separately identified neutrality 3
as a fundamental requirement.' 4 Professor Giorgio Bernini
weighs in on the inter-relationship between the three basic traits,
explaining that independence is "the result" of neutrality and
impartiality, the two being "prerequisites" to independence. 5
He distinguishes between neutrality and impartiality, positing
that neutrality refers to the "likelihood for the arbitrator to be,
and remain, wholly equidistant in thought and action through-
out the arbitral proceedings," whereas impartiality involves the
arbitrator's "status to be actually tested in the context of the con-
10. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 201. Employing this metaphor, one won-
ders whether the two sides of independence and impartiality are both necessary to form
the coin, or whether having one side means that the other side is indubitably present.
If the latter is true, then perhaps not much should be read into the ICC Rules requiring
only independence and omitting impartiality.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The term "neutral" or "neutrality" might have a different meaning in domestic
arbitration seen in the United States than in international arbitration elsewhere. In the
former, "neutral" often refers to the chair or the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal,
and not party-appointed arbitrators, who, far from being neutral, "may be predisposed
toward the party appointing them." AAA, CODE OF ETHics FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMER-
CtAL DispuTEs Canons IX.B, X.A(1) (2004) [hereinafter AAA, CODE OF ETHics]. See RED-
FERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 202 (referring to "non-neutral" and "neutral" arbitra-
tors).
14. See Lalive, supra, note 7, at 23; Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the
Tribunal, 9 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 45, 73 (1998).
15. Giorgio Bernini, Report on Neutrality, Impartiality, and Independence, in THE ARBI-
TRAL PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARBITRATORS 31, 2.1, 2.2 (1991).
2008] PRACTICE AND PREDICAMENT
crete relations existing between the arbitrator(s) and each indi-
vidual party." 16 Whereas Professor Bernini proposes that neu-
trality is subsumed into the independence concept, Professor
Pierre Lalive's statement that neutrality "goes further than ...
independence and impartiality"'" suggests that neutrality has a
more prominent role among the three qualifications, and is
more than a mere subset of another."' Despite the characteriza-
tion of neutrality as "equidistance in thought and action,"19 the
common view is that the neutrality of the arbitrator in interna-
tional arbitration is generally seen as a matter of geographic or
national equidistance.2" Indeed, commentators have noted that
neutrality is largely synonymous with nationality, such that refer-
ences to neutrality generally mean national neutrality (or neu-
16. Id. at 31, 2.3; see also TIBOR VARADY, JOHN J. BARCELO III & ARTHUR T. VON
MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 265
(3d ed. 2006) ("Neutrality is not synonymous with impartiality. Rather, it is an exterior
sign or an indication of likely impartiality; neutrality is easier to recognize, and easier to
translate into standards"). Professor William W. Park notes simply that "[t]he type of
neutrality sought by internationalists focuses on what might be described as 'reversibil-
ity.' An adjudication process is neutral if the parties' nationalities could be reversed
(French plaintiff becomes American, and American defendant becomes French) with-
out changing the result in the case." William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Eco-
nomic Co-operation, 12J. INT'L ARB. 99, 103 (1995).
17. Lalive, supra note 7, at 24.
18. Id. Yet another commentator would give impartiality primary billing: "It is
clearly beyond any doubt that impartiality is to be considered as the principal require-
ment for an arbitrator;" but she then acknowledges that "some problems may arise with
regard to the 'independence requirement' and to the 'neutrality requirement' as well."
Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi, Ethics for International Arbitrators, 67 UMKC L. REV. 93, 104
(1998). There is likely no final word or universal agreement on the definitions of the
three terms and their inter-relationship. Professor Bernini notes:
Students of arbitration tend to deal indiscriminately with neutrality, impartial-
ity, and independence of arbitrators. The borderline between these defini-
tions cannot be clearly traced, as all are characterized by a common goal,
namely the safeguard of equal treatment as regards the arbitrators' intentional
conduct vis-A-vis the parties.
Giorgio Bernini, Cultural Neutrality: A Prerequisite To Arbitral Justice, 10 MICH. INT'L L.J.
39, 40 (1989).
19. Bernini, supra note 15, at 31 2.3 (emphasis added); see also Lalive, supra note
7, at 26; VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 16, at 265.
20. See Goodman-Everard, supra note 3, at 156. The "equidistance" phrasing em-
phasizes that the arbitrator is literally equally distant from the parties, and not closer
(more partial or biased) to one party than the other. The term, used for a geometric
figure, places the arbitrator (x) at the apex and the two parties (y, z) at the other two
vertices of an isosceles triangle:
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tral nationality) .21 Nationality,22 in turn, appears to be widely
understood to mean citizenship.2 3 The London Court of Inter-
X
y Z
In an insightful piece, Professor Lalive would require in arbitrator neutrality more
than mere nationality or geographic location, someone who is:
[M]ore than a national lawyer, someone who is internationally-minded,
trained in comparative law and inclined to adapt to a comparative and truly
"international outlook." In this way, he will really be neutral in relation to the
legal systems and methods, whether procedural or substantive, of both par-
ties-systems and methods which, whatever may be the law chosen to govern
the subject-matter in dispute, are bound to influence to some extent the par-
ties' attitudes and presentations, consciously or not, as arbitration practice fre-
quently reveals.
Lalive, supra note 7, at 27-28.
21. See Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and
Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L
395, 400-01 (1998); see also Goodman-Everard, supra note 3, at 156; Lalive, supra note 7,
at 26. Another observer, however, warns that "neutral nationality should not be allowed
to become an end in itself-it is only relevant insofar as it provides some guide to,
indication of or justifiable doubts as to impartiality." Landau, supra note 14, at 74.
There appears to be a suggestion that neutrality can be satisfied merely when na-
tional borders are crossed, that is, when the arbitrator is from a(ny) third country. But
some decisions by arbitral organizations indicate that relative proximity of the arbitra-
tor's country to each of the countries of the parties will also be considered. Consider
the report of an ICC arbitration involving a British claimant and Yugoslavian respon-
dent, with Zurich as the seat of the arbitration, where a Hungarian national was named
as chair. "Upon objection from the British party that in naming Zurich as the seat it
had been intended to have a neutral, non-eastern bloc chairman, the [ICC Court of
Arbitration] agreed not to confirm the appointment of the Hungarian national and
decided to apply to the Finnish national committee to suggest a chairman." W. Lu-
RENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK &JAN PAUtLSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION 224 (3d ed. 2000) (citing Michael A. Calvo, The Challenge of ICC Arbitra-
tors-Theory and Practice, 15 J. INT'L ARB. No. 4, Dec. 1998, at 63, 69-70).
22. In the commentary, it is the rare author who openly asks, "What does 'national-
ity' mean?" GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALS 623 (2d ed. 2001).
23. See Donald Francis Donovan & David W. Rivkin, International Arbitration and
Dispute Resolution, 143, 155 (1999); see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 202
(stating, in discussion of nationality, "[t] he country in which the arbitrator was born, or
the passport carried, should be irrelevant."). One arbitrator expressed to this author
the following views on the meaning of nationality:
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national Arbitration ("LCIA") is one of the few major arbitral
organizations that offers in its rules any elaboration of what na-
tionality means, and addresses foreseeable questions relating to
citizenship: one who has citizenship in more than one country is
treated as a national of each country;24 persons who are citizens
of the European Union are regarded as nationals of the differ-
ent member countries, and not as having the same nationality;
25
and "[t]he nationality of parties shall be understood to include
that of controlling shareholders or interests. "26 The other major
arbitral organizations have no such clarifying language, presum-
ably allowing administrator discretion to address questions of na-
tionality and citizenship on a case by case basis.
The mechanistic definition of nationality as determined by
citizenship is certainly easy to apply, but, as commentators have
advanced,27 one wonders if citizenship should be the sole or
even primary index of determining nationality. If nationality in
its definition should be more faithful to geographic equidistance,
should it not take into consideration other indicators of national
identification or affiliation? In all events, whereas impartiality is
generally seen as a subjective trait, neutrality-if used inter-
changeably with nationality-can be achieved in virtually all situ-
ations with objective certainty.
That neutrality is generally synonymous with nationality ap-
pears to have support in the text of the major arbitral rules.28
I can only confirm that the word, nationality, is used in different ways all over
the world. Practically everywhere except in the United States of America it
means the same thing as citizenship of a particular sovereign state. It has nothing to
do with the national or ethnic origin that people may have or claim, or with
the citizenship of their parents at the time of birth, or their former citizenship
if they have changed.
Letter from Dr. Pierre A. Karrer, Hon. President of ASA Swiss Arbitration Assoc., to
Ilhyung Lee (Jan. 16, 2002) (on file with Fordham International Law Journal) (emphasis
added).
24. See LCIA Rules, supra note 9, art. 6.3. An ICC arbitration adopted the same
policy, disqualifying an arbitrator with dual U.S. and Italian citizenship from serving as
chair, where one of the parties was a U.S. national. See CRAiG, PARK & PAULSSON, supra
note 21, at 224-25 n.50.
25. See LCIA Rules, supra note 9, art. 6.3. This provision contemplates the ques-
tions raised by Born, "[a]re Germans and French nationals of the European Union?"
and "[a]re there different nationalities in North America?" BoRN, supra note 22, at 623.
26. LCIA Rules, supra note 9, art. 6.2.
27. See infta text accompanying notes 57-59.
28. The rules discussed herein are those of: the most recognized ad hoc arbitra-
tion (UNCITRAL Rules), the major arbitral organizations (ICC, LCIA, AAA Interna-
6092008]
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None of these rules explicitly refer to or require "neutral" tribu-
nals, but most call for some consideration of nationality. Of
course, parties may agree on the nationality of the arbitrator,
which reminds us that party autonomy is the beginning (and
often controlling) point of the arbitration method. Where there
is no agreement, however, the various rules provide for consider-
ation of arbitrator neutrality. The requirement of diversity of
nationality between the tribunal and the parties, save the excep-
tion of affirmative party waiver, is clearly set forth in the rules of
the LCIA: "Where the parties are of different nationalities, a
sole arbitrator or chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal shall not
have the same nationality as any party unless the parties who are
not of the same nationality as the proposed appointee all agree
in writing otherwise."2" But the requirement set forth in the
LCJA Rules is not typical of the arbitral rules. Some organiza-
tions' rules require the nationality of the arbitrator and of the
parties to be different, but provide significant exceptions, e.g., in
"suitable circumstances" (International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC")) 0 or "special circumstances such as the need to appoint
a person having particular qualifications"" t (World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO")). The rules of yet other orga-
nizations provide that nationality of the arbitrator is a matter of
discretionary consideration for the appointing authority. For ex-
ample, the American Arbitration Association International Rules
provide that "the administrator may appoint nationals of a coun-
try other than that of any of the parties." 2 A similar result is
foreseeable under the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Rules, which state that the ap-
pointing authority "shall take into account... the advisability of
appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than the national-
tional), and organizations devoted to specialized classes of disputes (International Cen-
tre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization ("'WIPO")).
29. LCIA Rules, supra note 9, art. 6.1.
30. ICC Rules, supra note 9, arts. 9(1), 9(5). Importantly, in addition to "suitable
circumstances" being present, there must not be a timely objection from either party.
Id. art. 9(3).
31. AIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Rules,
art. 20(b), WIPO Publication No. 446(E) (effective from Oct. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
WIPO Rules].
32. AAA International Rules, supra note 9, art. 6(4) (emphasis added).
20081 PRACTICE AND PREDICAMENT
ities of the parties."33 Some arbitral rules-namely, the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
("CIETAC") Rules34 and the Swiss Rules of International Arbitra-
tion 35-have no mention whatsoever of the nationality of the ar-
bitrator.36
Party agreements concerning the national neutrality of the
arbitrators, or arbitral rules relating to arbitrator nationality
under which the parties have agreed to arbitrate, must be ad-
hered to. Failure to do so can be fatal; the subsequent award
may be set aside by a court of law with jurisdiction over the arbi-
tration seat, or be refused recognition or enforcement by courts
of other jurisdictions that are signatories to the New York Con-
33. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 9, art. 6(4) (emphasis added). Notably, in the
UNCITRAL Rules, consideration of the nationality of the arbitrators is in the very same
provision as that referring to the independent and impartial arbitrator. The UNCI-
TRAL text lends support to the view that independence, impartiality, and neutrality are
fundamental qualifications to be considered as a single package.
34. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
("CIETAC"), Arbitration Rules (2005) [hereinafter CIETAC Rules]. The possibility
under the CIETAC Rules of the presiding arbitrator being a Chinese national in an
arbitration involving Chinese and non-Chinese parties has been controversial. See Ben-
jamin 0. Kostrzewa, China International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission in 2006:
New Rules, Same Results?, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 519, 529 (2006).
35. Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (2006), available at http://www.swiss
arbitration.ch/pdf/SRIA.english.pdf [hereinafter Swiss Rules]. One commentator of-
fers a defense of the absence of the nationality requirement in the Swiss Rules, stating
that it was a "conscious choice of the drafters ... who preferred to leave the [adminis-
tering authority] with the widest discretion in this respect." Micha Bahler, Composition
of the Arbitral Tribunal, in Swiss RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION COMMENTARY 45,
69 (Tobias Zuberbfihler, Christoph Miller & Philipp Habegger eds., 2005).
36. Arbitrations relating to investment disputes between governments and foreign
investors, administered by ICSID, are governed by perhaps the most labyrinthian pres-
entation of rules with respect to the nationality of arbitrators. Initially, the parties may
agree to one or any uneven number of arbitrators; where there is no agreement, the
tribunal is to be composed of three arbitrators, one selected by each party and the
president of the tribunal by agreement of the parties. Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. 37, Aug. 27,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. Either party must direct a communication to
the other party naming two arbitrators, one party-appointed arbitrator-who must not
be a national of the country of either party-and another whom that party proposes to
be the president of the tribunal. Upon receipt of this communication, the other party
is to name its party-appointed arbitrator-again, who must not be a national of the
country of either party-and concur in the first party's proposal of the tribunal presi-
dent or propose another. Then, in the case where the second party proposes a tribunal
president different from that of the initiating party, the initiating party is to notify the
other party whether it concurs in that party's proposed president. ICSID, Rules of Pro-
cedures for Arbitration Proceedings, R. 3, ICSID Basic Doc. ICSID/15 (1985).
612 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:603
vention.37  For "the composition of the arbitral tribunal
[that] was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties"
remains a ground to set aside the award38 and to refuse its recog-
nition and enforcement.39
In sum, parties are free to agree that the arbitrator may be a
national of the same country as one of the parties. Absent agree-
ment, a review of the text of the major arbitral rules reveals that
not all guarantee national neutrality of the arbitrator. Instead,
most rules call for some consideration of the arbitrator's nation-
ality, or provide exceptions where nationality diversity can be re-
fused. Nevertheless, it is reported that the practice under most
arbitral rules is that the nationality of the arbitrator must differ
from those of the parties.4 ° Indeed, commentators indicate that
national neutrality of the arbitrator is the prevailing practice in
today's international commercial arbitration;" one describes the
appointment of the arbitrator of a nationality different than the
parties to be "fundamental. '4 2 Practitioners and parties consider
nationality of the arbitrator vitally important,43 and are appar-
37. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
38. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 9, art. 34(2) (a) (iv); see Bundesgestz fiber
das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG], Loi frd~rale sur le droit international priv6
[LDIP] [Switzerland Federal Code on Private International Law Act] December 18,
1987, SR 291, art. 190(2) (a) (Switz.) (providing that award can be challenged only "[if]
a sole arbitrator was designated irregularly or the arbitral tribunal was constituted irreg-
ularly").
39. New York Convention, supra note 37, art. V(1)(d); see UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 9, art. 36(1) (a) (iv).
40. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 202; see also BORN, supra note 22, at
623; CRAiG, PARK & PAut.ssoN, supra note 21, at 224; Hans Smit, The Future ofInterna-
tional Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L
L. 9, 18 (1986-87).
41. See Bishop & Reed, supra note 21, at 404; Landau, supra note 14, at 73; see also
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 202 ("[T]he usual practice in international com-
mercial arbitration is to appoint a sole arbitrator (or a presiding arbitrator) of a differ-
ent nationality from that of the parties to the dispute.").
42. Landau, supra note 14, at 73.
43. See BORN, supra note 22, at 623. The practice commentary advises counsel to
specify the nationality of the arbitrator in advance. See 2 DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 49:3
(3d ed. 2007); Lucille M. Ponte & Erika M. Brown, Resolving Information Technology Dis-
putes After NAFFA: A Practical Comparison of Domestic and International Arbitration, 7 TUL.
J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 43, 59 (1999); see also DOUGLAS H. YARN & GREGORY TODD JONES,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN GEORGIA § 14:15 (3d
ed. 2007). In practice, however, the nationality of the arbitrator is not explicitly identi-
fied in available arbitration clauses reviewed by commentators. See Christopher R.
Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitration Clauses: Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE
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ently successful in obtaining tribunal neutral nationality.
Professor Lalive offers a basic, and very human explanation
for the relevance of the arbitrator's nationality in the arbitration
setting: "[I]t is because of its supposed implications: by an in-
stinctive reaction, parties will generally assume without much
further thought that a prospective arbitrator is likely, or even
bound, to share his country's ideology and common values, if
any."4 4 If this candid assessment is the motivating force for what
is now the general rule and widespread practice of appointing
an arbitrator of a neutral nationality, it is a rule and practice that
has resulted from human reaction prevailing over reason or
principle. Despite the requirement of arbitrators to be indepen-
dent and impartial, a prospective arbitrator's nationality may be
disqualifying if it coincides with that of the parties, absent party
agreement to the contrary. Redfern and Hunter note that "[i] n
an ideal world, the nationality of a sole arbitrator, or of the pre-
siding arbitrator, should be irrelevant."45 Nevertheless, in the in-
ternational setting, sensitivity to national identification is, rightly
or wrongly, a significant reality. Business entities may be eager
to participate in transactions in a borderless economy, but when
a dispute arises, they revert to their national boundaries, and na-
tional identification. This is the culture of international arbitra-
tion. Students, teachers, practitioners, and administering orga-
nizations routinely identify parties by their nationality, even in
situations when the nationalities are not relevant to the particu-
lar discussion.4 6 This is not to be faulting. The subject after all,
is international commercial arbitration.
Given the prevalence and reality of national identification
and suspicion of national favoritism, Professor Lalive notes that
neutral nationality of the arbitrator is necessary, for without it,
"an unhealthy atmosphere of doubt and fear is likely to ap-
pear."47 The doubt and fear is of arbitrator bias toward the party
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 57, 60 (Christopher
R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); see also Stephen R. Bond, How To Draft
an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), ICC Int'l Ct. of Arb. Bull., Dec. 1990, at 14, reprinted in
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH,
supra, at 65, 76.
44. Lalive, supra note 7, at 26.
45. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 202.
46. Of course, party nationality could be quite relevant in a host of situations relat-
ing to, among other issues, choice of law questions.
47. Lalive, supra note 7, at 25.
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with the same nationality, notwithstanding his obligation to be
independent and impartial. Perhaps the "requirement" of a
neutral national is best understood not by the presence of actual
partiality or bias, but rather the "appearance" of it.48 In brief,
there is a "greater degree of confidence... on all sides if there is
no chance that one party will get a better hearing because of
some cultural or national identification between the party and
the arbitrator."49 To give one of several possible examples, in an
arbitration involving Israeli and Egyptian parties, "a Swiss arbitra-
tor can usually be characterized as more neutral than an Israeli
or Egyptian. '"50
An analogy from the sporting arena will support the need
for national neutrality of the tribunal in international commer-
cial arbitration. Football (soccer, in some jurisdictions) is a
sport that has worldwide appeal and interest. The level of fan
passion for the game is rarely seen in other sports. On the inter-
national stage, the crowning event is the World Cup, organized
and sanctioned by the F6d6ration Internationale de Football As-
sociation ("FIFA"), the international governing body of football.
The finals competition of the World Cup brings together the na-
tional teams of thirty-two countries for a month-long tourna-
ment that crowns a world champion national team. The tourna-
ment itself is preceded by grueling regional qualification
matches held over two years. Regarding the selection of referees
for the 2006 World Cup, FIFA's regulations specified that the
referees, assistant referees, and fourth officials of every match in
the preliminary and the final competitions were to be from, not
only countries other than those in the matches,"' but also from
countries "not included in the same group as the matches in
question."5 2
48. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 204; see also Avraham Azriele, Improving
Arbitration Under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: A Framework for a Middle-East Free
Trade Zone, 67 ST. JOHN L. REv. 187, 224-25 (1993); Lalive, supra note 7, at 25.
49. Landau, supra note 14, at 73.
50. Park, supra note 16, at 103.
51. Fhdfration Internationale de Football Assoc. (FIFA) Exec. Comm., Regulations
2006 FIFA World Cup Germany, art. 29(2) (2005), available at http://www.fifa.com/
mm/document/tournament/competition/fwc06%5fregulations%5fen%5fl 558.pdf.
The Regulations also provided that the appointment of the referees, assistant referees,
and fourth officials, was left to the FIFA Referees' Committee, whose decisions were
"final and not subject to appeal." Id. art. 29(3),(4).
52. Id. art. 29(2). For the first round of the preliminary and the finals competi-
tions, teams are placed in a group under a round robin pool play format, at the end of
PRACTICE AAD PREDICAMENT
The analogy to football offers useful parallels to the arbitra-
tion setting. The counterpart of the game of football is com-
merce. Matches are played and business transacted, often at the
most sophisticated levels, in the international setting. Individual
matches are arbitration cases, with governing rules agreed in ad-
vance. The teams on the pitch are the parties in arbitration,
with participants identified by their respective nationalities.
Referees are the sole or presiding arbitrator, and participants in
the exercise must have some confidence that a match will be
called and a case decided fairly, without partiality or bias to one
side. Thus, by rule and custom, or both, neither the referee nor
the arbitrator may be of the same nationality as either of the
teams or parties, respectively.5" Were this rule not followed, the
potential for appearance of partiality and bias is large, the deci-
sions adverse to the team of the other nationality would be sub-
ject to suspicion, and participants' confidence in the system
shaken. 4 Thus, all referees and officials are disqualified from
taking part in given matches, due simply to their nationality. Al-
though qualified referees are essential to the advancement of
football, as are equally qualified arbitrators in an arbitration mat-
ter, football is foremost for the teams, as arbitration is for the
parties (and not for the referees or arbitrators, respectively).
Despite the common rule and practice of appointing an ar-
bitrator of a neutral nationality, and the motivating forces be-
hind it, the requirement is not without criticism. Commentators
quite aptly observe that even if an arbitrator from a third country
is appointed, it does not necessarily guarantee independence or
impartiality, 55 or that such an arbitrator would be "more impar-
tial than a national of the same country as one of the parties
which a predetermined number of the top teams in the group advance to the next
round.
53. The metaphor to sport is imperfect, of course. In arbitration, the parties may
agree to appoint an arbitrator of the same nationality as one of the parties; each party
also may choose a party-appointed arbitrator in arbitrations with three-member tribu-
nals. No similar opportunities are allowed in FIFA matches. Teams may not agree on
referees, and all referees and officials must be of different nationalities than both
teams.
54. Or in the converse, the referee may feel pressured to make borderline calls
adverse to his compatriots to appear more impartial. A parallel exists in the arbitration
setting, where arbitrators may agree in advance that a particular member of the tribunal
will pose certain questions to one of the parties as to avoid appearance of favoritism, or
to appear more unbiased.
55. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, 204.
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would be."56 Another criticism is that individual traits other
than national citizenship could give rise to fear of bias and ap-
pearance of partiality, but are not included as potentially dis-
qualifying factors. The arbitrator's domicile5" and residence58
are chief among these. Moreover, the commentary suggests that
if indeed neutrality and the appearance of unbiased impartiality
are the desired ends, perhaps common characteristics between
the arbitrator and parties, such as religion, regional origin,
ethnicity, or culture should also be considered. 9 By far, the
most frequently seen criticism of the national neutrality rule is
that it could work to disqualify the most qualified arbitrators for
the particular case-for example, those with expertise in the
governing law or the specialized field of business, or fluency in
the languages of the parties or the proceeding 6°-merely be-
cause of the technicality of the passport. As stated above, the
practice is designed to allay fears of bias and partiality, and the
appearance of the same, even if it might be based on general
assumptions and without much thought. Barring party agree-
ment to make an exception, this is the consequence and cost of
the neutral referee.
With this background, the next section addresses practical
situations in which the nationality of the arbitrator could arise as
a critical issue even before the arbitral tribunal begins its deliber-
ations.
II. NATIONALITY AND NATIONAL
IDENTIFICATION: HYPOTHETICAL
There are a number of foreseeable circumstances in the
contemporary international setting where a prospective arbitra-
56. Lalive, supra note 7, at 25.
57. See Landau, supra note 14, at 73; Smit, supra note 40, at 10 n.3 (citing Michael
Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980J. Bus. L. 164).
58. See Azriele, supra note 48, at 225 ("[T]oday the significance of nationality or
citizenship is diminishing, while a person's residency has a growing importance.").
59. See VARAD', BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 16, at 265; Lalive, supra note 7,
at 26, 27. Given the current world climate, in some settings, a common religion be-
tween the arbitrator and one of the parties might give rise to concern of arbitrator
neutrality, even more so than common nationality. Within this general discussion, one
is reminded of the call for "cultural neutrality" in the tribunal. See Bernini, supra note
18, at 40; Goodman-Everard, supra note 3, at 156.
60. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, 202-03; Landau, supra note 14, at 73;
Smit, supra note 40, at 18.
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tor's national identification or affiliation, short of national citi-
zenship, would raise questions of the propriety of appointment.
Consider the prospective arbitrator whose:
A. domicile or residence is a country other than that of his
national citizenship, but is the same as one of the parties;
B. national origin, prior domicile, and prior citizenship, all
of the same country, are the same as one of the parties;
C. national origin is the same as one of the parties; and
D. spouse is a national (citizen) of a country of one of the
parties.
Would any of these characteristics be disqualifying? Should
a prospective arbitrator disclose them prior to confirmation? As
Professors Varady, Barcelo and von Mehren have noted, the mat-
ter of arbitrator partiality based on group affiliation is a sensitive
subject, and "a principled approach to group-biases is next to
impossible. The exclusion of individuals, because of their group
affiliation, opens a Pandora's box. '6 1 Or, as another commenta-
tor has suggested, comprehensive rules of neutrality cannot be
adopted, "or one would never be able to find any suitable arbi-
trator at all."62 With respect to the suitability of arbitrators, the
rules of most administering organizations allow challenges of ar-
bitrators only when there are circumstances as to raise 'justifia-
ble doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence."6
The ICC rules do not include this language, instead referring to
the challenge of arbitrators "whether for an alleged lack of inde-
pendence or otherwise.'"64 The rules do not further elaborate on
what might meet the 'justifiable doubts" or "otherwise" stan-
dard. The administering organization makes the ultimate deci-
61. VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 16, at 266.
62. Goodman-Everard, supra note 3, at 156.
63. AAA International Rules, supra note 9, art. 8(1); see also Swiss Rules, supra note
35, art. 10(1); CIETAC Rules, supra note 34, art. 26(2); WIPO Rules, supra note 31, art.
24(a); LCIA Rules, supra note 9, art. 10.3; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 9, art. 10(1).
This standard is consistent with that in the UNCITRAL Model Law art. 12(2): "An
arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality or independence ... " UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note
9, art. 12(2).
64. ICC Rules, supra note 9, art. 1 (1) (emphasis added).
65. Here, the IBA Guidelines offer some guidance. See IBA Guidelines, supra note
8, at 7-8. The Guidelines posit that an arbitrator should be self-disqualified if "facts or
circumstances exist . . . that from a reasonable third person's point of view having
knowledge of the relevant facts, give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's im-
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sion on arbitrator challenges, often without announcing reasons
for the decision. In practice, challenges based on group affilia-
tion are often rejected.6 6
One is reminded of the words of Professor Philippe
Fouchard, on the rules of the French code, which "remain most
discreet on the person, the mission, rights and obligations of the
arbitrator."6 7 Reading this passage with some license and lati-
tude then, the responsibility falls on the arbitrator in the first
instance to act with prudence and good judgment, bearing in
mind the nature of the arbitration method and the importance
of party confidence in it. This approach inevitably raises the
question of what if anything the arbitrator should disclose before
appointment, relating to any number of issues, including the ar-
bitrator's national affiliation.
Toward discretion and decision on the question of disclo-
sure relating to the arbitrator's national identity or affiliation,
the arbitrator has available multiple sources for guidance. First,
the majority of the rules of administering organizations provide
that the standard for arbitrator disclosure is the same as that for
challenge, that is, the presence of circumstances that raise justifi-
able doubts as to the arbitrator's independence or impartiality.68
This is an objective standard, but again; one without much gui-
dance.69 Importantly, the ICC approach differs in that its rules
partiality or independence." In addition, "[d]oubts are justifiable if a reasonable and
informed third party would reach the conclusion that there was a likelihood that the
arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented
by the parties in reaching his or her decision." Id. at 8. This is an objective, "reasonable
third person test." Id.
66. At an international commercial arbitration workshop attended by arbitrators
and practitioners, one speaker stated that "the vast majority" of challenges against arbi-
trators (not specifically limited to challenges based on the arbitrator's national affilia-
tion) are rejected, and that many are "patently ridiculous on their face." Jennifer Kirby,
Deputy Sec'y Gen., ICC Court of Arbitration, Remarks at the ICC Arbitration Workshop
(June 11, 2007); see Drahozal & Naimark, supra note 43, at 147, 158 n.41 (summarizing
challenges of arbitrators in ICC arbitrations).
67. VARADy, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 16, at 266 (quoting Philippe
Fouchard, Le statut juridique de 1'arbitre dans la jurisprudence francaise, 1996 REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 325, 326).
68. See AAA International Rules, supra note 9, art. 7(1); CIETAC Rules, supra note
34, art. 25(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 9, art. 5.3; Swiss Rules, supra note 35, art. 9(2);
WIPO Rules, supra note 31, art. 22(b); see also UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 9, art. 9.
The standard is the same in the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 9, art. 12(1).
69. Redfern and Hunter observe that some of the major arbitral institutions "give
no specific guidelines as to matters that ought to be disclosed. It is not an easy topic,
because people from different cultures approach the problem from different view-
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offer a more subjective, party-centered approach, calling for dis-
closure of "any facts or circumstances which might be of such a
nature as to call into question the arbitrator's independence in
the eyes of the parties.'70 Here, one may refer to Professor Ber-
nini's relation of neutrality as a subset of independence, such
that if neutrality is questioned, it impacts linearly to indepen-
dence. Second, international arbitrators also have available rec-
ommended codes of ethics, principally, those issued by the Inter-
national Bar Association ("IBA")-the Rules of Ethics for Inter-
national Arbitrators, 7  and the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration ("IBA Guidelines") .72 Both
are the product of full deliberations by well-informed and exper-
ienced professionals in the international arbitration field, with
the worthy purpose of enhancing ethical arbitrator practices.
But as recommended guidelines, neither text is binding on any
arbitration or arbitrator unless the parties agree to make them
so. The IBA Guidelines are in line with the ICC's subjective stan-
dard on arbitrator disclosure, and emphasize that "parties have
an interest in being fully informed about any circumstances that
may be relevant in their view." 73 Third, there is the oft-stated ad-
points." REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 205. If the objective 'justifiable doubts"
standard is employed for arbitrator disclosures, the IBA Guidelines propose the view of
"a reasonable third person[ ] .. .having knowledge of the relevant facts." IBA Guide-
lines, supra note 8, at 7.
70. ICC Rules, supra note 9, art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
71. IBA, Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (1998), available at http://
www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/pubs/Ethics-arbitrators.pdf.
72. IBA Guidelines, supra note 8. This Essay gives proper recognition of the IBA
Guidelines, which offer reasoned guidelines relating to arbitrator impartiality and inde-
pendence and arbitrator disclosure about which parties, arbitrators, courts, and policy
makers had little guidance. In addition to specific standards and explanations, the IBA
Guidelines offer non-exhaustive lists of items that the arbitrator: must disclose ("Red
List," further divided into "Non-Waivable" and "Waivable" sub-categories); should dis-
close ("Orange List"); and need not disclose ("Green List"). IBA Guidelines, supra note
8, at 15-25. It should be noted that nationality of the arbitrator is not mentioned in any
of the lists. See Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Comparing Arbitrator Standards of Conduct in Inter-
national Commercial Trade Investment Disputes, DisP. RFSOL. J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 76, 78. The
IBA Guidelines are indeed "a beginning, rather than an end, of the process." IBA
Guidelines, supra note 8, at 5.
73. IBA Guidelines, supra note 8, at 10 (Explanation to General Standard 3(a))
(emphasis added). There are slight variations in phrasing between the ICC and IBA
approaches. The IBA Guidelines state, "If facts or circumstances exist that may, in the
eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or indepen-
dence, the arbitrator shall disclose such acts or circumstances . . . ." Id. at 9 (General
Standard 3(a)). The ICC Rules state, "[A] prospective arbitrator shall . . .disclose in
writing any facts or circumstances which might be of such nature as to call into question
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vice heard at professional conferences, arbitrator training ses-
sions, and law school classrooms, that whenever there is doubt as
to disclosure, one should disclose in the exercise of caution and
professionalism."4 Finally, the individual arbitrator's own code
of conduct regarding propriety of disclosure (indeed, regarding
every aspect of arbitration practice where mandatory rules are
not explicitly provided) will work to tip the balance toward a fi-
nal decision.7"
A hypothetical international arbitration matter will provide
the setting for a practical application of much of the above dis-
cussion relating to neutrality, nationality, equidistance, disclo-
sure, challenge, and appointment. Assume a business transac-
tion involving Goh-ryuh Co., a Korean manufacturer, and Meiji,
Inc., ajapanese distributor. They enter into a contract in which
Meiji will be the exclusive distributor of Goh-ryuh's products in
Japan for a term of years. Spirited negotiations that led to the
agreement also resulted in a standard arbitration clause, stipulat-
ing that the proceedings are to be administered under the rules
of a named international arbitral organization, provided that the
seat of the arbitration is Tokyo, and that the law of Korea will
govern substantive rights under the contract. A dispute arises,
with mutual allegations of a material breach of contract: Meiji
the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties." ICC Rules, supra note 9, art.
7(2).
74. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 8, at 9 ("Any doubt as to whether an arbitrator
should disclose certain facts or circumstances should be resolved in favour of disclo-
sure."); see also AAA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 13, Canon II.D ("Any doubt as to
whether or not disclosure is to be made should be resolved in favor of disclosure.").
Erring on the side of disclosure is good advice, of course, although some arbitrators
may report an experience of a disclosure of a minor matter that leads to objection from
a party, removal by the administering organization, or both. In such a case, the arbitra-
tor's conviction that disclosure is advised when in doubt could be matched equally by
his conviction that (i) the specific circumstances disclosed will not affect his indepen-
dence, impartiality, or neutrality; and (ii) in the event that the arbitrator chose not to
disclose, a party's attempt in a court of law to set aside the resulting award or a chal-
lenge to refuse recognition and enforcement upon subsequent discovery of the circum-
stances would fail. The IBA Guidelines recognize this possibility. IBA Guidelines, supra
note 8, at 3 ("Disclosure of any relationship, no matter how minor or serious, has too
often led to objections, challenge and withdrawal or removal of the arbitrator.").
75. This final factor is offered, in light of the author's experiences with students,
who, when posed with questions of disclosure in hypothetical situations that do not
appear to be governed by any rule or guideline, reach their decisions based on their
own sense of what is "right."
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alleges delivery of defective products; Goh-ryuh alleges failure of
timely periodic payments. A sole arbitrator is to decide the case.
In this scenario, absent party agreement to the contrary, the
administering organization would not likely appoint a Korean or
Japanese national as the arbitrator; either nationality would be
disqualifying for prospective arbitrators. It is entirely under-
standable that Meiji would oppose a Korean arbitrator, and that
Goh-ryuh would oppose ajapanese arbitrator, due to (stated bla-
tantly) the presupposition and general assumption that an arbi-
trator of Korean or Japanese nationality, respectively, would be
partial to the cause of his countrymen. Stated another way, party
skepticism and fear, and the appearance of bias and partiality,
would counsel an arbitrator with a neutral nationality. Appear-
ances, doubts, and fears may be more pronounced when the two
countries of the parties, like Korea and Japan here, have had
uneasy political and social relations over the years.76
If the parties insist on national neutrality, a prospective arbi-
trator of Korean or Japanese nationality would be disqualifying,
even if he were lauded by professional peers as an arbitrator of
unimpeachable independence and impartiality, and even if he
were, like Caesar's wife, beyond suspicion.77 That the arbitrator
possessed qualifications uniquely suited for the case, for exam-
ple, fluency in both languages and expertise in Korean contract
law and Japanese arbitration procedure, would be beside the
point. Again, party agreement to such an arbitrator notwith-
standing, this practice is an example of the consequence of a
stubborn insistence on the rule of national neutrality and also
highlights its chief criticism. Instead, neutrality could be ob-
tained here simply by resorting to an arbitrator of any third
76. The two East Asian countries are separated by the East Sea (according to Ko-
rea) or the Sea of Japan (according to Japan). Japan occupied Korea for nearly four
decades in the first half of the twentieth century until the Japanese surrender at the
close of the Second World War. Although political and social relations have improved
over the years, there is still continuing tension over, among other issues, Japan's ac-
knowledgment of its treatment of the so-called "comfort women" during the Colonial
era, and the disputed ownership of the Dokdo (according to Korea) or Takeshima (ac-
cording tojapan) islets in the waters separating the two countries. SeeJon M. Van Dyke,
Reconciliation Between Korea and Japan, 5 CHINESEJ. lrr'L L. 215, 234-35 (2006).
77. This is a variation on the traditional saying, the original of which was attributed
to Julius Caesar. "I wished my wife to be not so much as suspected." JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 99 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., Little, Brown & Co., 15th ed. 1980)
(1855).
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country-China, Australia, the United States, or Canada, for ex-
ample.
The underlying hypothetical involves Japanese and Korean
parties and a prospective arbitrator with varying indicia of na-
tional identification or affiliation with one of the countries. As-
sume for purposes of discussion that the traditional questions of
independence and impartiality-apart from nationality-are not
at issue, and that the arbitrator himself has declared his suitabil-
ity to serve. Preliminarily, citizenship of the prospective arbitra-
tor is likely to be known, but in all circumstances must be dis-
closed, given that citizenship and nationality are considered in-
terchangeable terms in many circles, and nationality must be
known to obtain national neutrality. Citizenship is the easiest
factor.
Toward further discussion and thought on the subject, and
to provide a source of comparative reference, the author con-
ducted a survey of Korean lawyers experienced in international
arbitration work at law firms in Seoul.7 8 The lawyers were asked
to assume that they are counsel to a Korean company that is in-
volved in an arbitration matter with a Japanese company. The
survey provided descriptions of the various prospective arbitra-
tors provided for in the hypothetical herein. For each type of
prospective arbitrator, survey participants were asked whether
(1) the description raised a concern (none at all, some, or seri-
ous) about the arbitrator's impartiality or independence; and
(2) they would or would not object to the prospective arbitrator
being appointed." Nineteen lawyers participated in the sur-
vey.8 All nineteen responded that a prospective Japanese arbi-
78. The author requested contacts at the firms to forward to arbitration attorneys
an e-mail message soliciting participation in the survey to be taken on the Internet.
The message indicated that participation in the survey was voluntary, and that the re-
sults would be anonymous and confidential, other than their discussion and analysis in
a resulting publication. It was not possible to ascertain the response rate. The survey
was conducted in July and August 2007. The full survey is reproduced in the Appendix.
The survey was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the author's university.
Ilhyung Lee, Survey on Korean Lawyers Experienced in International Arbitration Work
(July-Aug. 2007) [hereinafter Survey] (unpublished survey, on file with Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). The same survey taken of Japanese arbitration lawyers in Japan
would also be informative, of course.
79. See id. Participants were also given the opportunity to provide comments or
explanations for their responses.
80. See id. The author acknowledges that the small number of respondents is a
limitation of the survey. Another is that the survey provided information on the nation-
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trator, with Japanese citizenship and living in Japan, would raise
concern about the independence or impartiality of the arbitra-
tor. Two indicated "some" concern, and the remaining seven-
teen indicated "serious" concern. Of the nineteen participants,
seventeen responded that they would object to such an arbitra-
tor being appointed. One indicated that he or she would not,
but this appears to be an inadvertent selection, in that this par-
ticipant indicated serious concern as to the arbitrator's indepen-
dence or impartiality."s One of the nineteen participants in the
survey did not respond to questions of objecting or not objecting
to the arbitrator's appointment.
A. Domicile and Residence
What about another prospective arbitrator, a U.S. citizen
(with no Japanese or Korean origin) whose domicile or resi-
dence of significant duration is either Japan or Korea? Should
the domicile or residence be disqualifying? Should the arbitra-
tor previously disclose it? This author is in agreement with the
view that one's domicile and residence of significant duration
should be given consideration in the appointment of arbitrators
and must be disclosed.82 After all, national equidistance in-
cludes a geographic component, and the domicile of the arbitra-
tor is "his true, fixed, and permanent home, and principal estab-
lishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the inten-
tion of returning."83 In some cases, the domicile would better
satisfy the geographic concept of a home jurisdiction over citi-
zenship, determined by the passport. Indeed, one commentator
reports an ICC arbitration involving a U.S. party, in which a
Swedish national who was a partner in a law firm based in New
York could not serve as the chair of the tribunal.8 4 Although it is
ality or national affiliation (or association) of the arbitrator, and little else, which could
have exaggerated its significance for respondents.
81. Id. Of the four other types of arbitrators in the survey, this participant had
indicated: serious concern and objection to one type of arbitrator; some concern and
no objection to two other types of arbitrators; and some concern and an objection to
the last arbitrator.
82. Some commentators have indicated that domicile more than citizenship
should determine nationality. See supra note 57.
83. BLACK's LAW DIcrloNARy 435 (5th ed. 1985) (citing Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.
Super. 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965)).
84. See W. Michael Tupman, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 38 INr''L & CoMp. L.Q. 26, 28 n.13 (1989).
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not clear whether the decision was based on the prospective arbi-
trator's U.S. residence, domicile, or both, implicit in the deci-
sion is that national neutrality was lacking. Indeed, the ICC
rules explicitly state that in the appointment and confirmation
of arbitrators, the court will take into account the arbitrator's
"nationality, residence, and other relationships with the countries
of which the parties ... are nationals. 's 5 If a prospective arbitra-
tor's residence 6 can be disqualifying, the more permanent dom-
icile should be more so.
Whether mere domicile or residence in the country of one
of the parties would satisfy the objective standard of 'justifiable
doubts" as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence
under the arbitral rules, for purposes of challenge and disclo-
sure, is uncertain. The question of whether a prospective arbi-
trator should disclose his domicile and residence if different
than that of his citizenship is more easily answered under the
subjective standard advanced in the ICC rules and the IBA
Guidelines. One may speculate that some Korean and Japanese
parties would have concerns about the partiality of an arbitrator
whose domicile or residence of foreseeable duration is in Japan
or Korea, respectively. On this question, the survey reveals that
out of the nineteen participants, three indicated that an Ameri-
can arbitrator (with U.S. citizenship) living and working in Japan
would raise no concern at all about the independence or impar-
tiality of the arbitrator, eleven indicated some concern, and five
indicated serious concern. Twelve out of the eighteen lawyers
responding stated that they would object to such an arbitrator.
One did not respond. One of the participants who expressed
serious concern and preferred objection explained separately
that an American arbitrator who lives and works in Japan "might
have [a] deep understanding of Japanese culture and could be
quite fond of it. In that case those arbitrators could see the case
in the context ofJapanese culture and way of thinking which will
be detrimental to the Korean way of arguing the case."8 7
85. ICC Rules, supra note 9, art. 9(1)(emphasis added).
86. "Residence implies something more than mere physical presence and some-
thing less than domicile." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 1176 (citing Peti-
tion of Castrinakis, 179 F.Supp. 444, 445 (D. Md. 1959)).
87. Survey, supra note 78.
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B. Prior Citizenship; Prior Domicile
In the continuing discussion of whether factors other than
citizenship may indicate a nationality status as to give rise to chal-
lenge or disclosure, the question is ripe for a prospective arbitra-
tor whose former status is that of a Japanese national, but whose
citizenship, domicile, and residence have changed to those of a
neutral country. In the hypothetical, assume that the prospec-
tive arbitrator was born in Japan to Japanese parents, immi-
grated to the United States, renounced Japanese citizenship in
order to receive U.S. citizenship, and is now a U.S. domiciliary
and resident. The question is whether one's prior citizenship,
prior domicile, and unchanging national origin give rise to justi-
fiable doubts as to the arbitrator's independence or impartiality;
or specifically in the ICC setting, whether the same fits under the
prospective arbitrator's "other relationships with the countries of
which the parties are ... nationals""8 that the organization must
consider. The question does not lend itself to easy answers. Per-
haps this scenario best highlights the point that nationality is not
only a function of citizenship and geographic presence, but also
a matter of self-construction, and is in the eye of the beholder.
In other words, does the arbitrator see himself as Japanese8 9 to
the extent that it should have a bearing on his suitability to serve,
despite his declaration that he is independent and impartial?
The difficulty is that this inquiry would require an unprece-
dented and unorthodox examination of the prospective arbitra-
tor. 0
Regarding disclosure of national origin, birthplace, prior
88. ICC Rules, supra note 9, art. 9(1).
89. Or does he see himself as a 'Japanese in America," "Japanese-American,"
"American of Japanese descent," or simply, "American."
90. In this regard, some information about the arbitrator can be gleaned from his
publicly available curriculum vitae, e.g., his name (whether Neil Aoki or Ichiro Aoki),
and language skills (fluency in Japanese or English only). For inquiring parties and
counsel, these are surface characteristics, at best, and certainly not conclusive. Parties
may be inquisitive about other questions, which would not likely be asked formally.
Such questions would include whether the arbitrator: if married, has a Japanese or
non-Japanese spouse; observes holidays of the mother country; has relatives in Japan
whom he visits, and if so, the frequency and duration of the trips; and is a sports fan,
and if so, which team he roots for in matches between Korean and Japanese national
teams. These would be unwelcome questions that the rule of national neutrality (under
non-citizenship grounds) has wrought, and sound of the very Pandora's box against
which commentators have cautioned. See VARADw, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note
16, at 266.
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citizenship, and prior domicile (all based in Japan), it is, again,
problematic whether this would arise to the objective 'justifiable
doubts" standard. Disclosure is recommended, in the view of
the author, under the ICC or IBA approach, in that it could raise
doubts as to the partiality of the arbitrator, in the eyes of the
parties. Of relevance here is the (rarely addressed) explanation
in the IBA Guidelines that "[i] n determining what facts should
be disclosed, an arbitrator should take into account all circum-
stances known to him or her, including to the extent known the
culture and the customs of the country of which the parties are
domiciled or nationals."" It is not clear what the intended
scope of this passage is, or the meaning of "culture" and "cus-
toms. ' ' 92 Nevertheless, it is a fair statement that one whose birth-
place, prior citizenship and domicile is Japan (or Korea) is likely
to know that an arbitrator of Korean (or Japanese) descent de-
ciding a case between Korean and Japanese arbitrators would
raise concerns of partiality, despite the arbitrator's physical and
legal detachment from the mother country. A prospective arbi-
trator of Korean or Japanese descent more removed from the
local culture might be less knowing of the societal mindset.9" In
the survey, all nineteen of the Korean lawyers responded that an
arbitrator born in Japan to Japanese parents, with current citi-
zenship and residence in the U.S. would raise concern about the
independence or impartiality of the arbitrator. Nine indicated
some concern, and ten indicated serious concern. Sixteen law-
yers stated that they would object to such an arbitrator; two indi-
cated no objection. This limited survey suggests that in some
situations and for some counsel, the technicality of the present
passport, or even of domicile or residence, should not be con-
trolling in determining national neutrality; rather, national ori-
gin or ethnicity should be equally, if not more, impacting.
C. National Origin
This variation involves the prospective arbitrator who is a
second generation Japanese, that is, one whose parents emi-
grated from Japan as adults, but who was born and reared in the
91. IBA Guidelines, supra note 8, at 10 (Explanation to General Standard 3(a)).
92. "Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English
language." RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYvoRDs: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 87
(rev. ed. 1985).
93. This scenario is discussed in the next variation.
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United States, with U.S. citizenship and domicile. Here, at least
on the surface, the geographic presence is less than in the previ-
ous variation. Perhaps the detachment from the country of one
of the parties is sufficient as not to raise 'justifiable doubts" for
the reasonably informed third party. Yet the question of arbitra-
tor self-perception and the improbable examination of the arbi-
trator to ascertain his perception of his own nationality status are
also apt here. 94 Some immigrant groups stateside, more than
others, attempt to maintain the language, customs, and practices
of their mother country, and may well identify themselves prima-
rily with their originating country. Yet members of the second
generation in other immigrant groups might see themselves as
American. The reality of this uncertainty makes disclosure of na-
tional origin the safer course, again bearing in mind the local
culture and customs of the countries of the parties. The survey
of Korean lawyers is of interest: out of the nineteen participants,
three responded that an arbitrator born in the United States to
Japanese parents, with U.S. citizenship and residence, would
raise no concern at all about the independence or impartiality of
the arbitrator, ten indicated some concern, 95 and six indicated
serious concern. Fourteen participants stated that they would
object to such an arbitrator; four would not. Further discussion
regarding the challenge of, and disclosure by, this type of arbi-
trator will invite other variations, e.g., a prospective American
arbitrator one of whose parents, or one of his four grandparents,
is Japanese (or Korean).96 There must be a point where chal-
lenge must be rejected and disclosure deemed unnecessary far
94. See supra note 90.
95. The author would adjust these figures to read two expressing no concern at all
and eleven expressing some concern. The reason is that one participant selected some
concern, but also an objection to the arbitrator. This participant expressed some con-
cern to the other four prospective arbitrators, and indicated an objection to all of the
four.
96. Challenging questions of a similar nature in hypothetical arbitrations have
been raised elsewhere. For example:
[2.] In an arbitration between a Croatian party and a Serbian party could
o', of the arbitrators be a person of Croatian ethnic origin, born and raised
in-Croatia while it was part of Yugoslavia, who had moved to Switzerland and
become a Swiss citizen?
Could a Turkish Cypriote arbitrate a dispute between a Greek and a Turkish
party?
Would a Turkish Cypriote born and raised on Cyprus, who had moved to the
U.S. and become a U.S. citizen be acceptable?
[3.] In a dispute between an Israeli company and Egyptian company, could
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before the "one-drop rule" once seen in U.S. law and policy. 7
D. Spouse
The final variation addresses the prospective American arbi-
trator, with U.S. citizenship, domicile, and residence, with no
Japanese (or Korean) national origin, but whose spouse is Japa-
nese (or Korean). Responses to this author from a small num-
ber of colleagues in the field indicate that this circumstance, by
itself, should not give rise to 'justifiable doubts" as to the arbitra-
tor's impartiality or independence, and the challenge should be
unsuccessful and disclosure unnecessary. Indeed, an official of a
major arbitral organization, posed with this situation, suggested
to this author that such a challenge would be rejected out of
hand, stating, "We don't do spouses." Disclosure under the sub-
jective standard of the ICC and IBA Guidelines, however, merits
more discussion. The subjective approach refers to doubts as to
partiality in the eyes of the parties, the specific parties, and not
to "reasonable" parties, nor even to reasonable parties of a given
nationality. Moreover, this is an instance where the distinction
between the subjective standard for arbitrator disclosure and the
objective standard for challenge is stark.9" For the curious, in
the survey, out of the nineteen Korean lawyers, one responded
that an American arbitrator with a Japanese spouse would raise
no concern at all about his independence or impartiality, seven-
teen indicated some concern, and one indicated serious con-
cern. Over half of the participants-ten out of eighteen-would
object to this arbitrator. The view expressed by the official of the
arbitral organization above would be disappointing news to
some Korean lawyers.
A brief summary of the survey results is in order. Korean
lawyers in the survey were nearly unanimous in indicating seri-
ous concern of the independence or impartiality of a Japanese
arbitrator, withJapanese citizenship, who lives in Japan, and also
an American of Jewish background be an arbitrator? An American of Arab
background?
VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 16, at 287.
97. This is "the idea that anyone with any African 'blood' is legally black." Daniel
J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule 1600-1860, 91
MINN. L. REV. 592, 593 (2007).
98. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 8, at 10 (Explanation to General Standard
3(a)).
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in objecting to the appointment of such an arbitrator. This was
quite expected, according to commonly held notions of national
neutrality in the international arbitration setting. Importantly,
all participants in the survey also indicated concern of an arbitra-
tor with U.S. citizenship and residence, but born in Japan to Jap-
anese parents; a great majority of the participants would also op-
pose such an arbitrator. The numbers were only slightly lower
for an arbitrator with U.S. citizenship, born in the U.S. to Japa-
nese parents, indicating the difficulty for the survey participants
of segregating national origin from nationality. Finally, the ma-
jority of the participants expressed concern (though less serious
in degree) for the American arbitrator living in Japan, as well as
the American arbitrator living in the United States, or who has a
Japanese spouse, and more than half indicated that they would
object to both types of arbitrators. As one participant explained
succinctly, "Any affiliation with Japan would be a cause for con-
cerns from a practitioner's perspective, I believe. Vice versa."99
Again, a survey of Japanese lawyers on the same subject would be
revealing.
As indicated above, the two countries in the hypothetical
were not selected by coincidence or haphazard chance. First,
Korea and Japan are countries with significant economies, and
many business entities in both countries are actively engaged in
international business transactions. Korean and Japanese com-
panies in significant number also do business with each other.
Second, and more relevant here, the choice of Korean and Japa-
nese parties for the hypothetical arbitration was to highlight the
potential realities of nationalism and sensitivity to national iden-
tification. Arbitrations involving parties of countries with uneasy
and complex histories might result in the same considera-
tions,"' 0 while those without this dynamic (perhaps arbitrations
involving U.S. and Canadian parties, for example) might present
less opportunity for concern and discussion.
CONCLUSION
Business entities have a strong interest in engaging in opera-
tions with international partners. When disputes inevitably oc-
99. See Survey, supra note 78.
100. In this group, perhaps arbitrations between nationals of Iran and Iraq, India
and Pakistan, and Israel and Egypt could be included.
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cur, parties invariably resort to national self-identification, and
insist on national neutrality of the deciding tribunal. The rea-
sons are based more on instinctive human reaction than reason,
and are quite impacting. This Essay offers a focused examina-
tion of arbitrator nationality, including its meaning, relation
with neutrality, independence, and impartiality, and how it may
present challenging questions in practice. Questions of party
challenge of the arbitrator and arbitrator disclosure will require
consideration of what standard to apply, as illustrated in the hy-
pothetical variations. Perhaps no issue better highlights the in-
ternational character of arbitration disputes than the nationality
or the national affiliation of the parties and arbitrators. Ques-
tions of national neutrality will continue to be of interest.
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APPENDIX
Arbitration Survey
Assume that your client is a Korean company that is in a
legal dispute over a contract with a Japanese company. The two
parties have agreed to resolve the dispute by arbitration. A sole
arbitrator will decide the case.
Regarding the selection of the arbitrator, descriptions of va-
rious prospective arbitrators appear below. For each descrip-
tion, please click on your preferred responses.
A. The prospective arbitrator is American, with U.S. citi-
zenship, lives in the U.S., and is married to a Japanese wo-
man.
1. In the selection of the arbitrator, the description of
the prospective arbitrator described in "A":
[_] does not raise any concern at all about the arbi-
trator's independence or impartiality
[-] raises some concern about the arbitrator's inde-
pendence or impartiality
[_] raises serious concern about the arbitrator's in-
dependence or impartiality
2. Please select one of the following concerning your
views on the suitability of the prospective arbitrator
described in "A" for the arbitration.
[] I would object to this arbitrator being selected.
[] I would not object to this arbitrator being se-
lected.
B. The prospective arbitrator is American, with U.S. citi-
zenship, and lives and works in Japan.
3. In the selection of the arbitrator, the description of
the prospective arbitrator described in "B":
[_] does not raise any concern at all about the arbi-
trator's independence or impartiality
[_] raises some concern about the arbitrator's inde-
pendence or impartiality
[_] raises serious concern about the arbitrator's in-
dependence or impartiality
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4. Please select one of the following concerning your
views on the suitability of the prospective arbitrator
described in "B" for the arbitration.
[] I would object to this arbitrator being selected.
[] I would not object to this arbitrator being se-
lected.
C. The prospective arbitrator was born in the U.S. to Japa-
nese parents, now has U.S. citizenship, and lives in the U.S.
5. In the selection of the arbitrator, the description of
the prospective arbitrator described in "C":
[_] does not raise any concern at all about the arbi-
trator's independence or impartiality
[_] raises some concern about the arbitrator's inde-
pendence or impartiality
[_] raises serious concern about the arbitrator's in-
dependence or impartiality
6. Please select one of the following concerning your
views on the suitability of the prospective arbitrator
described in "C" for the arbitration.
[] I would object to this arbitrator being selected.
[] I would not object to this arbitrator being se-
lected.
D. The prospective arbitrator was born in Japan to Japa-
nese parents, moved to the U.S. years ago, and now has U.S.
citizenship and lives in the U.S.
7. In the selection of the arbitrator, the description of
the prospective arbitrator described in "D":
[-] does not raise any concern at all about the arbi-
trator's independence or impartiality
[_] raises some concern about the arbitrator's inde-
pendence or impartiality
[_] raises serious concern about the arbitrator's in-
dependence or impartiality
8. Please select one of the following concerning your
views on the suitability of the prospective arbitrator
described in "D" for the arbitration.
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[_] I would object to this arbitrator being selected.
L] I would not object to this arbitrator being se-
lected.
E. The prospective arbitrator is Japanese, with Japanese
citizenship, and lives in Japan.
9. In the selection of the arbitrator, the description of
the prospective arbitrator described in "E":
[_] does not raise any concern at all about the arbi-
trator's independence or impartiality
[_] raises some concern about the arbitrator's inde-
pendence or impartiality
[_] raises serious concern about the arbitrator's in-
dependence or impartiality
10. Please select one of the following concerning your
views on the suitability of the prospective arbitrator
described in "E" for the arbitration.
[_ I would object to this arbitrator being selected.
_] I would not object to this arbitrator being se-
lected.
11. If you have any comments relating to Questions #1
through #10 or any of your answers, please provide
them here:
I]
When you have answered all of the above questions, please
be sure to click "DONE" below.
[DONE]
Thank you!
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